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Confronting Technological
and Tactical Change
Allied Anti-Sub111arine Warfare in the
Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic
Douglas M. McLean
he recall of German U-boat wolfpacks from
the central north Atlantic at the end of May
1943 ended the most costly phase of the shipping
war for the Allies. Never again would the German
U -boats inflict dangerously high shipping losses. 1
The naval war remained bitter. nonetheless. for
the U-boats refused to give up. turning instead
to new technology and new tactics. Right to the
end, they continued to present a plausible threat
that caused concern in high Allied circles. Indeed,
in January 1945 the First Sea Lord of the
Admiralty was moved to warn that. "The high
shipping losses which may occur during the first
half of 1945 may well prejudice the maintenance
of our forces in Europe .... "2

Improvements in Submarine
Technology

T

The ensuing struggle in early 1945 led to a
confrontation between improvised technological
improvements and tactical changes by the Uboats countered by operational and tactical
adaptation produced in reply by Allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. This last phase
of the battle of the Atlantic was fought out for
the most part in the confusing and difficult
shallow waters around the coasts of the United
Kingdom and off the east coast of Canada,
moving to the shores of the United States only
in the last few months of the war. This campaign
provides insights into how new and unexpected
initiatives by an enemy could be dealt with even
when no te~hnological solutions were readily at
hand. It also illustrates the difficulty that both
submarine and antisubmarine forces encounter
when operating in the challenging environment
of shallow water. 3

omewhat paradoxically, the new challenges
to Allied ASW forces in 1944-45 were born
of their very success in the Spring of 1943. In
desperation. the Germans adopted new tactics.
These featured submerged penetration of focal
areas of trade by individual boats, which then
waited for targets of opportunity, made sudden
ambushes. and then immediately executed
extreme evasive manoeuvres for prolonged
periods. Unlike the massed "wolfpack" attacks
against convoys which had been the hallmark of
U -boat operations in 1942-1943, these so-called
"static'"1 tactics seldom caused severe losses
because U-boats spent far more time avoiding
detection than aggressively seeking opportunities
to attack. Yet their new success in avoiding
detection in areas where the Allies had previously
been able to detect and destroy them caused
concern in some quarters of the Allied High
Command. 5 As 1944 drew to a close this
apprehension grew because it appeared that the
U-boats were not only mastering the art of
evading antisubmarine forces but were once
more becoming effective in their attacks.G

S

The new equipment which allowed this
dramatic change in U-boat tactics was the
schnorkeJ.7 This was a comparatively simple
device which provided enough air to allow Uboats to operate their diesel engines while
submerged. 8 Little more than a tube about as
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Sleek type XXI U-boats at Lisahally. Northern Ireland, 1945. U-2582. on the lf(ft. has her sclmorkel mast
raised. The submarine in the middle is U-2511. the only type XXI to undertake a wartime cruise.

long as the submarin~·s periscope, the schnorkel
greatly reduced a U-boat's vulnerability to
searching Allied forces because its small head
was far less conspicuous than the submarine's
conning tower. Moreover, travelling slowly and
carefully, the U-boat needed to use the schnorkel
only three to five hours in every twenty-four. 9
Most U-boat commanders prudently schnorkeled
at night to avoid visual detection of the smoke
produced by the submarine's diesel engine. In
addition, the head of most schnorkels was fitted
with a detection device that gave warning ofthe
approach of Allied radars. 10 Since the U-boat was
already submerged when using its schnorkel, an
alert crew could usually dive deep and escape
before an attack could be launched even if an
Allied radar operator could distinguish the small
echo of the tube from the random returns
provided by ocean swells or flotsam and jetsam.
Schnorkel-equipped U -boats were sent into
the English Channel during the summer of 1944
to attack the heavy flow of shipping that
sustained the Normandy beachhead; their
commanders learned that they could operate in
the most heavily defended waters. 11 The Allies
had anticipated an aggressive response to the
June 1944 invasion and had prepared a
comprehensive defence in depth of the ChanneL
Massed ASW forces devastated U-boats not yet
equipped with schnorkels (at the time a majority)
but found schnorkel-equipped submarines a

frustratingly difficult opponent. 12 Although
shipping losses remained comparatively light,
schnorkel-equipped U-boats regularly prowled
in the vicinity of the shipping routes to the
beachheads. Even when discovered these
submarines proved elusive targets, and. in view
of the immense concentration of ASW forces.
remarkably few were destroyed. ~~l
In addition the Allies (thanks to decryption
of high-level German message traffic, an
intelligence source known as "Ultra") were
acutely aware of the possibilities of the new Uboat designs. 14 The Type XXI and Type XXIII
boats were the first conventional submarines
capable of rapid underwater manoeuvring. 15
Although they could sustain high-speed
manoeuvres for perhaps only an hour or an hour
and a half, these submarine were the most
menacing known at that time. 16 German
authorities assigned the highest priority to their
production in July 1943, but the first few only
became operational as the war ended. 17 The
potential impact of these vessels on the transAtlantic logistics of the Allied campaign in
Europe remains one of the most interesting
subjects for speculation. Fortunately for the
Allies, however, the war was fought with older,
Type VII and Type IX. U-boats re-equipped with
schnorkels and radar detectors.

24
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The only area where schnorkel-fitted boats
could achieve any success was in the coastal
areas near ports and focal points of shipping. 18
Although both Allied and German naval officers
considered in late summer 1944 that a return
to open-ocean wolfpack operations would be the
only way in which Allied shipping could be
interdicted effectively, and though such tactics
might arguably have been practical using the new
submarines, 19 the Germans realized that such
tactics were impossible with the older U-boats.
The Germans were encouraged by the ability of
schnorkel-equipped submarines to operate in
such heavily defended waters as the English
ChanneF 0 , but were acutely aware that simply
surviving was not enough. Shipping had to be
destroyed if the apparently inexorable Allied
advance was to be slowed. and too few ships
were being sunk. Still. the schnorkel-equipped
boats had just garnered the greatest success that
German submarines had enjoyed since the fall
of 1943. As the summer of 1944 waned,
Befehlshaber
der
U-boote
(U-Boat
Headquarters. or BdU) decided that until
improved types ofU-boats became operational,
an offensive in coastal areas offered the best
chance of inflicting losses on the Allies. 21

Shallow Water Submarine Warfare
ith their decision to move into coastal
waters using older schnorkel-equipped Uboats, the Germans created a difficult problem
for the Allies. Shallow water ASW had been rare
since early in the war. The Germans had found
operating in coastal waters without schnorkels
prohibitively difficult because of constant Allied
air patrols. 22 In the first half of the war U-boats
endeavoured so consistently to escape to deep
water that Allied doctrine prior to the Normandy
Invasion presumed that after an attack or upon
being detected. U-boats operating in shallow
water would head for deep water. The possibility
that aU-boat might either settle on the bottom
or move closer inshore was "considered
unlikely. "2 :l

W

As it became apparent that the U-boats had
begun to do exactly that, the Allies discovered
that shallow water ASW was, for many reasons,
a particularly demanding art. Sound conditions
are extremely changeable in shallow water, a
function of tidal and current variations. The effect

of the bottom is another factor which can be
largely ignored in deep water, but not along the
coast. Rocks and shoals, as well as shipwrecks
and schools of fish, produce convincingly
submarine-like echoes. Finally, the effect of fresh
water from rivers and streams is frequently
pronounced, and, in combination with
temperature variations, cause especially dense
layers to form in the water that so affect the
propagation of sound as to effectively "blind" the
sonar of a searching warship.
Consequently warships acting as close escort
to convoys rarely detected aU-boat in shallow
water before the submarine attacked. During this
stage of the war U-boats often rested on the
bottom in the vicinity of shipping traffic, rising
up to fire a torpedo only when alerted by the
sound of an approaching convoy. Waiting to
detect convoys passively by their noise did not
prove adequate, however. and in mid-December
1944 BdU ordered all U-boats to remain at
periscope depth during daylight hours so as to
increase their chance of finding targets visually. 24
This helped the U-boats somewhat. and the Uboat's chance of being detected by the escort
before it attacked remained slight. After firing.
the submarines usually either made off at slow
speed just above the bottom. sometimes simply
drifting with the tide, or rested on the bottom
until searching forces had moved on. 2 s Close
escort vessels had little chance to destroy a
submarine employing such snap attacks and,
since they had to remain with their convoy. could
rarely stay in the vicinity of an attack long enough
to conduct the prolonged and methodical search
necessary to find a bottomed or deep. slowmoving U-boat.
Aircraft patrolled coastal waters incessantly
but rarely spotted schnorkels, and had great
difficulty attacking even if an aircrew was
fortunate enough actually to find one. 2 New
sensors such as sonobuoys were being
introduced, but these were in a primitive stage
of development. On occasion U -boats were
detected by sonobuoys and then attacked by airdropped homing torpedoes - a very modern
tactic indeed - but too rarely to have any
significant impact on the campaignY The main
effect of ASW aircraft was the caution that their
pervasive presence induced among most U-boat
crews. Seldom daring to surface, U-boats
travelled slowly underwater at a fraction of their
(i
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surfaced cruising speeds, groping for clues to
their actual position. 28 Radio communication
with BdU, which required the submarines to
surface and exposed them to the efficient Allied
radio-direction-finding network, became
extremely intermittent and contributed to a
growing inability at BdU to follow operations at
sea. 29 Overall, ASW aircraft substantially reduced
the effectiveness of U-boats at sea, but did not
neutralize them. More direct measures were

The strategic bombing campaign, for its part,
succeeded in stopping U-boat production as the
war drew to a close, and mines laid in the Baltic
by these aircraft severely hindered the training
of new U -boat crews. :lO These achievements gave
promise of causing the entire German submarine
campaign eventually to wither. but there was little
that strategic bombers could do to counter the
hundreds of U-boats that were already
operational.

needed.

"'
American hunter-killer groups had proved
9 formidable U-boat killers during 1943 and early
"!'
Ol
1944, but rarely encountered German
~ submarines in the later part of the war. As a
::J result of rationalization of command structures
[t and operating areas among the Allies in early
0
1943, the USN handled the central Atlantic and
the eastern seaboard of the United States, while
British and Canadian forces were primarily
responsible for the north Atlantic. Since by mid1944 few U -boats remained in the central
Atlantic, and not many submarines could reach
the eastern seaboard when they travelled
submerged, USN hunter-killer groups seldom
had any opportunity to show their mettle after
1943. When U-boats began to penetrate into US
waters in the last few months of the war, the
USN demonstrated remarkable adaptability and
success in countering them. 31 The growing
strength of the USN as the European war closed
did allow that navy to "maintain nearly as many

0)

Left: An unlikely place to find an air force
photographer! However. a good shot of the dummy
schnorkel mastfitted to the British training submarine
HMS Unseen. based at Digby. NS in early 1945.
Below: A hard targetfor radar or human eye. The

dummy schnorkel and search periscope of HMS
Unseen as they appear when the sub is submerged.
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ships and aircraft in the Canadian zone [the
waters adjacent to Newfoundland and the
Canadian coast] as the entire naval and air
strength normally available to the commanderin-chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic." 32
Nevertheless. it was at this late stage a minor
player, because the main battle against schnorkel
U -boats was now in the waters around the British
Isles, the one area still within reach of most Uboats in the beleaguered German fleet. Almost
by default, therefore. the main burden of countermeasures against the coastal campaign by
schnorkel-equipped U-boats fell toRN and RCN
"support groups."

Support Groups
he ships of these groups were theoretically
well-prepared to deal with the new German
tactics. They were the best equipped for ASWin
their respective navies. By this late stage of the
war, the majority were either frigates or an
equivalent class of vessels. fitted with the most
modern weapons and sensors. The role of
support groups was to find and destroy U-boats
wherever they operated.

T

The idea of a group of escorts whose primary
role was to counter U-boats was straightforward
enough. Experiments as early as 1941 had
indicated how effective such an organisation
could be.:tl However, it was only when enough
ships became available to provide close escorts
for all convoys that support groups were finally
established in significant numbers. As the battle
on the North Atlantic convoy routes approached
its peak in the spring of 1943, the formation of
five such support groups was one of the major
initiatives taken that resulted in the crushing
defeat ofwolfpack attacks. 34
The Royal Navy most commonly used
support groups as rapid reinforcements for
convoys either under attack or expected to come
under attack. This practise was extremely
effective as an antidote to wolfpacks, but lost its
utility as the Germans changed their tactics. USN
Hunter-Killer Groups, the American equivalent
of support groups, emphasized the actual
hunting of U-boats using radio-intelligence.
These USN groups were enormously successful
in the summer and fall of 1943. The debate over
which approach was more strategically and

tactically sound was a lively one both at the time
and since. However, the argument was reduced
to irrelevancy in the face of the new German
tactics, which largely denied both AngloCanadian and American forces the intelligence
they required to use these groups in their
preferred ways. :Js
The great strength of support and hunterkiller groups was that because they were not
preoccupied with protecting convoys they had
great flexibility. This allowed them to adopt
procedures which became the foundation of
eventual Allied success in the contest with
inshore submarines. Prolonged searches for Uboats became a staple in their tactical inventory,
as did extended operations in geographical areas
where U-boat activity was high.
During 1944 the number of support groups
in the North Atlantic grew to 17 RN and 7 RCN.:Hi
The predominance of the Royal Navy in support
groups was partly a result of its larger size, but
it also reflected the greater role the Royal
Canadian Navy continued to play in the close
escort of north Atlantic convoys. The reason for
this inequitable distribution is not clear in the
records, but it is not unlikely that the RN
considered close escort a less demanding task
than operating as a support group, and therefore
more suited to the RCN's capabilities.
Most support groups were allocated to
United Kingdom waters, which senior Canadian
and British officers appreciated was the critical
area. This left the Canadian coast inadequately
protected, but despite the risk the Canadian
Naval Staff recommended that the five RCN
support groups under the operational control of
the RN remain in UK waters "unless there is a
real need for them. "37 In other words, unless
intelligence provided clear indication that a large
number ofU-boats were en route to Canada or
shipping losses soared.
Despite the advantage of vastly superior
numbers, adequate time to search and good
equipment, support groups found the task of
locating schnorkel-equipped U-boats in coastal
waters extremely challenging. The first
experience these ships had with the new German
tactics was in the difficult shallow waters of the
English Channel in the wake of the Normandy
invasion. One particularly graphic account is
27
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provided by Allan Easton, who commanded the
destroyer HMCS Saskatchewan at the time. On
7 June 1944, his ship was narrowly missed by
two German torpedoes, one of which apparently
exploded prematurely, the other being detonated
by the anti-acoustic-torpedo decoy deployed after
the first explosion. While Saskatchewan and the
three other destroyers in the group saw the Uboat's periscope several times - sometimes in
very close proximity- and conducted numerous
attacks upon it. as well as a similar opponent
the next day, the only result was, in Easton's
words, "dead or unconscious cod rising to the
surface. "~ H
1

Compounding the difficulties faced by these
ships was the lack of a coherent tactical doctrine.
Some procedures had been prepared in
anticipation of the Invasion, and the techniques
developed to combat U-boats in deep water could
be applied to some extent in shallow water, but
it soon became evident that the Germans had
brought new and mysterious elements to bear
and a good deal more was required in response.
The first hints of new German tactics (such
as resting on the bottom to avoid detection) came
from prisoners of war rescued from U-boats
destroyed in the English Channel as the Invasion
began. The first Allied message discussing this
change appears to have been promulgated on
01 July 1944Y9 However, it was not until 25
August that the first new tactical search plan
(known as "Scabbard") that dealt with "static"
tactics was adopted. 40 In other words, it took
two to three months for the Royal Navy to react
as an organisation to the German change.
During this transition period, the ships made
do as best they could. Old tactics were adapted,
or improvised plans were worked up within
individual groups. 41 Although this was far from
sufficient, the novelty of the situation militated
against more rapid development of new tactics.
It was also evident that a number of new tactical
procedures would have to be developed:
"Scabbard" was but the first. It must also be
emphasized that simply promulgating tactical
procedures was only the first step in actually
employing new methods; plans must be
absorbed and practised by all ships before they
could be effectively employed, and in the best of
conditions this takes a good deal of time. In the
event, it would be almost another six months

after "Scabbard" was first circulated before Allied
anti-submarine ships began to demonstrate
notable proficiency in any of the tactical
techniques and procedures required to defeat
schnorkel-fitted U-boats.
A further reason for the somewhat measured
pace of the Allied response was that, initially, it
seemed likely that U-boat operations inshore
were only a passing phase dictated by the
Normandy Invasion. The limitations that U-boats
laboured under in shallow water were well
appreciated, and Allied intelligence considered
that a return to (potentially) more effective
wolfpack tactics would ensue once the Germans
gave up their efforts (largely futile in terms of
real effect) to interdict shipping through the
English Channel. 42 As August ended. however.
and the U -boats fled from the Biscay ports. firmer
evidence of German intentions came to light. It
became clear then that U-boats would
concentrate in the coastal waters around Britain
and not against mid-ocean convoysY

The Inshore Battle:
Tactics and Technology
he opening operations of the U-boats in the
British littoral were comparatively small in
scale, mostly because the evacuation of the
Biscay bases had dislocated the German navy's
organisation. A handful ofU-boats were sent out
to what were hoped, albeit more on the basis of
estimate than solid intelligence, to be the most
profitable hunting areas. The most successful
U-boat ofthis period. the U-482, operated in the
North Channel, the area just north of Ireland
where shipping from North America had been
routed since the fall of France. This boat's patrol
lasted from 16 August until the 26th of
September, and she claimed three merchantmen,
one corvette and one rescue ship, taking two of
her victims only fifteen miles from the Irish coast.
The success of this bold submariner in these
waters came as something of a shock to the
Allies. despite the experiences off Normandy. Not
only were all the merchantmen in convoy when
sunk, 44 but the U-boat traversed waters where a
special effort had been made to detect and
destroy U-boats on passage. 45 Although U-482
was the only submarine to achieve significant
success during this period. her accomplishments

T
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made it apparent that the Allies had a long way
to go in countering "static" tactics.

Command and Tactics
Yf"'he analysis of U-482's attacks led to a change
.1 in the command arrangements between
close escort groups and support groups. 46
Support groups had always been put under the
control of the Senior Officer of the close escort
group of whatever convoy they had been sent to
support. During the period when convoys at sea
were the focus of German attacks, this
arrangement was entirely appropriate; support
groups, which rarely stayed with any convoy for
more than a day or two. necessarily had a less
complete tactical picture than the Senior Officer
of the close escort."~ With the switch to static
tactics by U-boats. however. the situation was
radically altered. Since convoys were no longer
the focus of a running battle, support groups
were now tasked to operate in specific
geographical areas. Convoys were still
"supported" as they passed through these areas,
but now the support group's knowledge of the
peculiarities of a locality were far more important
than the close escort's familiarity with the
idiosyncrasies of a convoy. In particular. the
support group's knowledge of bottom conditions
and wreck locations in a local vicinity became
critical. As a result in mid-September 1944 the
senior officers of support groups were made
independent of the close escort when operating
in support of a convoy.'18
In September 1944 the RN officially
acknowledged that U-boats would probably
employ static tactics. From doubting that U -boats
would ever choose to bottom, the Royal Navy
had swung almost completely around. In a
message to all forces under his command
engaged in the fight against U-boats, Admiral Sir
Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief Western
Approaches, put forth the view that, "When a
ship in convoy is torpedoed in waters where a
U-boat can bottom it should be assumed that it
will do so provided immediate scaring tactics
[i.e. urgent ASW attacks] are adopted." 49 Ships
of the close escort were given detailed new tactics
as well, which varied depending upon whether a
support group was present or not. Previously
developed tactical procedures, "Artichoke" by day
and "Basin'' by night were adopted for the initial

reaction by the close escort to a torpedo attack.
"Artichoke" called for the escorts in the van of
the convoy to reverse course back through the
convoy columns en route to the stricken ship.
Details of "Basin" have not been found, but
presumably it called for the close escort to
congregate near the stricken vessel as well.
Particular emphasis was placed on the
importance of quick action as soon as there was
evidence of the presence of aU-boat. Once the
initial actions were completed, "Scabbard" was
to be conducted by either a part of the close
escort or, if one were available. by a support
group. 50
The Admiralty summarized the new methods
in a message in October 1944. This
recommended stationing escorts astern of the
convoy so that they could "pounce" upon aUboat in the wake of a torpedo attack. The
synopsis of U-boat intentions in the final
paragraph accurately outlined the new German
tactics, and stressed the change from previous
methods:
U-boats can now operate inshore and are likely
to adopt static tactics in place of the mobile
tactics which we have been used to dealing with.
Static tactics involve the use of curly and gnat
torpedoes fired from U-boats which endeavour
to lie in wait on the course of convoys. When no
targets are available U-boats are likely to move
with great caution and charge by snort [i.e.
schnorkel] mainly by night. On approach of a
hunting force [the U-boat] will probably bottom
or may drift with tide near bottom."

The tactical procedures developed in the late
summer and early fall of 1944 remained
essentially unchanged for the remainder of the
inshore campaign. 52 In practice it was not
uncommon for standardized tactical procedures
to be combined or slightly modified as escorts
reacted to unique situations. The general
principles in inshore ASW were, however,
constant: quick reaction and concentration of
forces in the vicinity of an attack to deter further
attacks and to destroy the enemy, followed by a
prolonged hunt by support group ships if the
enemy, as generally happened, eluded the initial
response.
Patrolling geographic areas near shipping
routes where U -boats might be lurking entailed
endless hours of repetitious effort, most of it to
classify the innumerable wrecks and other non-

29
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HMCS La Hulloise entering port at Liverpool, England, 7 April 1945. La Hulloise. a River-class ji·igat.e.
worked wilh both Escort Group 16 out oJ Halifax and Escort Group 25 based in Londonderry and Rosyth.
She was partially credited with the sinking oJ U-1302 in March 1945.

submarine contacts found in British waters.
Tactical procedures for these patrols evolved
with expeiience gained duiing the winter of 1944 I
45. Essentially there were two choices: either to
proceed at slow speed so that anti-acoustictorpedo decoys were unnecessary and maximum
asdic [i.e. sonar] effectiveness was assured, or
to proceed at moderately high speed, searching
with decoys deployed. The first approach gave a
relatively high probability of submarine detection
in the swept water but covered little area,
produced numerous false contacts, and gave Uboats some opportunity to evade because of the
warships' slow speed of advance. The second
option was less likely to detect aU-boat, but was
more likely to disturb any submarine present in
the search zone because of the greater area that
could be swept. If enough groups were available,
then a combination of these methods could be
productive, because U-boats intent on avoiding
the noisy high-speed groups might be ambushed
by the slow, stealthy ones. 5 3 However, because
there were seldom sufficient numbers in one
place for this ambitious scheme, most groups
alternated between the two approaches
depending upon weather and asdic conditions
and on the amount of time available to linger in
an area.

Detection, Classification, and
Prosecution

J\

ctually locating a submarine was a serious
throughout the campaign. The
relative number of U -boat detections by asdic in
the last year of the war was not markedly less
than it had been in earlier yearsY However, the
comparative ineffectiveness of other detection
assets (such as high-frequency direction-finding
(HF I DF) of radio signals, radar or visual
sight.ings) because of the almost constant
submergence ofU-boats meant that reliance on
asdic was far greater. With only one effective
sensor, the total number of detections dropped
dramatically. Initially, this led to grave concern
in some quarters that asdic did not work in
shallow water. The truth was more complex.
Asdic was somewhat less effective in shallow
water because of the number of non-submarine
contacts that confused operations there, but
there were also areas in both deep and shallow
water where U-boats could operate with relative
impunity due to hydrographic factors. The issue
in both deep and shallow water was initial
detection, and the Second World War asdic was
a poor sensor for this role (now known as
surveillance) because of its extremely limited

~roblem
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range. The overall problem was not so much with
asdic itself as that there were so few other
detection opportunities to complement asdic
searches - between mid -1941 and mid -1944
most boats had first been detected when
surfaced, either by radar or visually. "5
Once an asdic contact was gained, the
problem quickly became (as it is today) one of
classification- that is, deciding whether or not
the contact was a submarine. Contacts that
seemed convincingly like submarines were often
made. 56 Escorts were advised early in the
campaign to "plaster" each one. 57 This advice
was valid but obviously expensive. Not only did
it result in the expenditure of an enormous
amount of ordnance, but the time required to
attack all contacts disrupted searches for real
U -boats. The repeated detonation of large
amounts of explosive in the vicinity of the escorts
also caused wear and strain on the ship's hulls.
Expeditious classification of bottomed asdic
contacts became something of a "holy grail," and
escorts assiduously pursued it. Despite their best
efforts. all methods remained less than
satisfactory.
The size of the target as determined by asdic
proved to be a rough guide at best. The sound
quality of the echo returned by a contact was
similarly equivocal, with many non-submarine
contacts providing far sharper and clearer echoes
than the real item. A bottomed contact could be
identified if the vessel was equipped with an
appropriate echo sounder, but this technique
required a highly skilled crew. The Type 761 echo
sounder provided the best results, especially if
the vessel was adept enough to pass directly over
aU-boat in the same direction that the U-boat
was lying. This produced a trace that showed
the length, breadth and height of the Uboat,including the distinctive outline of its
conning tower. Even this result was not definitive,
for the waters around the British Isles had
become the resting place of many wrecked
submarines. A comparison of the position of the
contact with a chart of all known wrecks would,
given precise enough navigation, provide a final
determination of whether the contact was real
or not. Nevertheless, even if the wreck chart
indicated that the boat in question was long dead,
a good echo sounder trace would warrant a
cautionary attack.

Good navigation was essential to reduce the
number of unnecessary attacks, and ensure that
escorts remained in contact with targets that
proved to be a "live" submarine. Because of the
frequency of non-submarine contacts, it was not
unknown for escorts to be seduced from a valid
contact onto a nearby non-submarine contact.
A veteran of the inshore battle recalled an
incident in which one "U-boat kept us chasing
all night, and I am not sure that we did not start
after one U-boat and finish with another." 58 The
value of an accurate and easy to use radionavigation system while searching in such
difficult waters can scarcely be overstated. In the
last part of the war such a system, known as
Gee, became available in the English Channel
and southern Irish Sea, and many, although not
all, escorts in support groups were fitted with
the necessary receivers. Gee allowed escorts to
differentiate between contacts as close as one
thousand yards apart, and therefore enabled
warships to plot wrecks quickly and accurately.
Groups fitted with this equipment became very
familiar with the wrecks in their assigned patrol
areas after an initial period of endless contacts.
Gee was so valuable that support groups that
were only partially fitted complained in no
uncertain terms that more sets were essentiaJ.5n
Ships also used buoys to assist in their
prosecution of bottomed contacts. The "dan"
buoy, a small buoy that could be anchored in a
specific spot, was the recommended aid. Its
employment prevented escorts from drifting
inadvertently away from a contact through being
either set by tide or blown by wind while the
contact sat immobile on the bottom. The value
of such an aid to location in the featureless sea
was demonstrated on a number of occasions,
and its use was continually advocated by training
establishments. 60

Operational Results
The lowest point in the campaign occurred in
December 1944. During that month, U-boats
torpedoed 11 ships in British waters.rit No Uboats were sunk in the wake of these attacks,
and only three U-boats were destroyed by antisubmarine forces in U.K. coastal waters: two by
ships and one by aircraft. 5 2 The total number of
U-boats lost during the month was 14, but three
were the result of accidents, three were bombed
31
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in harbour, and one was from unknown causes.
Although the shipping losses to U-boat attack
were insubstantial in comparison to the vast flow
of Allied trade now crossing the Atlantic, the
impotence of anti-submarine forces was evident.
It was at this point, on 6 January 1945, that the
First Sea Lord expressed his serious concern
(quoted above) to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
His worst fear was that the U-boats had mastered
the difficulties of manoeuvring in shallow waters,
and were now becoming more aggressive. If this
were true, and experienced U-boat commanders
began returning to spread the word that convoys
could be attacked with relative impunity
providing proper tactics were employed, the
number of ships that might be sunk in the near
future was daunting. Fuelling his anxiety was
intelligence that powerful new Type XXI and XXIII
U-boats would soon enter the battle. The
combination of these grim possibilities led the
First Sea Lord to suggest that by the spring of
1945 it was possible that the worst Allied
shipping losses ofthe war might yet be suffered .53
It did not happen that way. Only a handful of

the new U-boats undertook wartime patrols, far
too few to have any effect or to provide enough
information to do more than speculate on what
might have been accomplished. More
importantly, the support groups began to gain
the upper hand over the older types ofU-boats. 64
The turning point came in February. While 11
merchantmen and three escorts were torpedoed
around the British Isles, three U-boats were
destroyed in the wake of their attacks, and,
significantly, another six fell to patrolling ships
before they could make any attacks. The
increasing numbers of U-boats detected and
destroyed before they could strike was clear
evidence ofthe growing experience and expertise
of support groups in shallow water operations. 65
Coastal Command accounted for two more Uboats, and one was shared between sea and air
forcesY 6 In short, the destruction of 14 ships
had cost the U-boat arm 12 submarines - a
devastating ratio. Nor was that all. Altogether
the Germans lost 21 U-boats from all causes in
all areas during February.
German losses continued to mount as the
war neared its end. In April U-boats sank ten
merchantmen and two escorts, but lost ten of
their number to Allied escorts and six more to
Coastal Command aircraft. with another one U-

boat kill was shared between the two services.
The total U-boat losses for April were 55, many
to bombing raids on German ports or while
attempting to flee at speed on the surface from
Germany to Norway as the Reich collapsedY
The older U-boats could no longer keep up
the fight. At the end of March and in early April
U-boats were ordered to move further off shore
where they would again try to hide in deep
waters. 68 It was a futile strategy, since it was
understood that individual U-boats positioned
well out to sea would sink very few merchantmen.
The main result of this last measure was that
fewer encounters took place between U-boats and
Allied escorts. Those that did were once again
in deep water. Indeed, the wheel had turned full
circle. In late April 1945. the Commander-inChiefWestern Approaches reminded his forces
that anti-submarine action was still possible in
deep water, and in the event U-boats were
detected:
.. .it will be necessary to forget tactics recently
developed for shallow water operations and
concentrate on those previously so successful in
deep waterY'

In less than a year the U-boats had been
forced to retire from the last area where they
could possibly enjoy success. Victory was less
than total, because U-boats continued to operate
in the Atlantic right up to the very end. but it
was far from hollow. The reason for the success
of Allied anti-submarine forces clearly stems
from the rapid and effective way in which the
opponents of the U-boats in this last campaign
adapted tactically to the challenge presented by
the new style ofU-boat warfare. The way in which
these groups were deployed to counter the
German initiative, as well as trained to deal with
new tactics, illustrates the effective operational
flexibility of Allied navies by this late stage of
the war. Despite these successes. the period of
adaptation was lengthy enough to cause distinct
concern in certain circles of the Allied High
Command. The delay was due partly to the
requirement to identify and react to the German
initiative, but it was also a consequence of the
inherent difficulties of conducting ASW in
shallow water. Not only did the support groups
have to become proficient in new tactics, but
their crews had to become accustomed to the
much more complex conditions commonly
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encountered in coastal waters. Only when new
tactics, training and experience all came together
were the Allies able to deal with the new
challenge. That they were successful speaks well
of their capabilities- that it took more time than
many thought it should demonstrates the
problems that even a veteran naval force has in
adapting to new initiatives by an opponent, and
to the difficulties of countering submarines in
coastal waters.
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